The Use of Injunctions in Labor Disputes by Rosenblum, Irl B.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 4 Issue 2 
January 1919 
The Use of Injunctions in Labor Disputes 
Irl B. Rosenblum 
Washington University in St. Louis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Irl B. Rosenblum, The Use of Injunctions in Labor Disputes, 4 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 078 (1919). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol4/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
THE USE OF INJUNCTIONS IN LABOR DISPUTES
PART III.
INJUNCTION IN RELATION TO PICKETING.
PICKETING DEFINED. Picketing is a more or less militant weapon
of the union which is employed to assist in making effective both the
strike and the boycott. Generally, it may be said to be a concomitant
with the strike-that is, a strike rarely occurs without an accompany-
ing action by pickets. As soon as the strike has been ordered, it is
the purpose of the union both to prevent the employer from obtaining
other servants and to compel him to grant their demands by injuring
his business in so far as they can-usually by means of a boycott. Both
of these purposes are speedily and officially accomplished by the picket.
Instances are numerous, particularly in local industrial circles, of the
ruinous results of the strike and boycott, as often put into effect by
the assemblage of workers appealing to the sympathies and prejudices
of their brother laborers and the public in general.
Most of the cases which have come to the higher courts, how-
ever, have arisen from picketing used in the strike, with but little
reference to its boycotting aims. Thus the definition commonly
accepted by the courts is that which is found in Black's Law Dic-
tionary. (page 897): "Picketing, by members of a trade union on
strike, consists in posting members at all the approaches to the works
struck against, for the purpose of observing and reporting the work-
man going to or coming from the works, and of using such influence
as may be in their power to prevent the workmen from accepting
work there." Further definitions of the term will be found in the
cases cited below, which will be classified according to the position
they assume concerning picketing as lawful or unlawful.
PICKETING AS UNLAWFUL PER Se. The lawfulness or unlawful-
ness of picketing is determined when it is shown whether the acts
of the unionists constitute either peaceable persuasion or intimidation.
However, this general rule requires some modification. In practice it
is most difficult for the courts to decide exactly when peaceable per-
suasion ceases and intimidation begins. Moreover, much care must
be exercised in issuing the injunction, so that it will permit the law-
ful persuasion while preventing the unlawful intimidation. Open
threats, much less actual violence, are not an indispensable accom-
paniment or condition of intimidation. In fact, in many instances
that which on the surface appears to be peaceable persuasion may in
the last analysis amount to intimidation by virtue of the intent which
lies behind it or the circumstances which surround it. For example,
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it may well happen in the stress and strain of a bitterly contested
strike that although merely peaceable persuasion is intended, the action
of the strikers becomes unlawful coercion because of the timidity
or unprotected condition of the persons molested. Even when the
picketing appears to be in good faith and is carried out peacefully to
all intents and purposes, it very often tends to intimidate such fright-
cred or unproteced workers.
Because of this tendency, a very few cases have held that the
picket is unlawful per se, under all conditions and without particular
reference to intimidation. Such decisions, however, have generally
included in their statement of the basis for the injunction granted,
facts which indicate that the picketing was accompanied by threats
or other conduct amounting to intimidation.
Thus, in Vegelahn v. Gunter,' the court held, among other things,
that the picketers might not congregate before the plaintiff's place
of business for the purpose of preventing persons from entering or
remaining in it. This prevented any intercourse with the non-union
men even though there were no threats nor intimidation offered. It
was also expressly stated in this case that the injunction should be
so limited as to relate only to persons who are bound by contract,
bu. should also prevent the strikers from interfering with persons
seeking to enter the employment, and persons already employed, but
not under contract.
Another case which similarly held the picket to be unlawful was
that of Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union.2 Here it was
decided that the injunction must broadly enjoin picketing, without
any qualification as to intimidation or force. The court declared that
to place pickets upon the complainants' premises in order to prevent
teamsers or other persons from going there, was unlawful. The
mere act was found to be intimidation, and as such constituted an
unwarranted interference with the right of free trade. The opinion
declares, "It will not do to say that these pickets are thrown out for
the purpose of peaceable argument and persuasion. They are intended
to intimidate and coerce. As applied to cases of this character the
!exicographers thus define the word 'pickets': 'A body of men be-
longing to a trades' union, sent to watch and annoy men working in
a shop not belonging to the union, or against which a strike is in
progress.' (Century Dict.: Webster's Dict.) The word had no
such meaning. This definition is the result of what has been done
1 167 Mass. 92-1896.
2118 Mich. 497-1898.
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under it and the common application that has been made of it. This
is the definition the defendants put upon it in the present case."
In Otis Steel Co. v. Local Union No. 218,8 the decision main.
tained that picketing per se was to be prohibited without any refer-
ence to force or violence. An interesting method of reasoning was
employed in arriving at the illegality of this picket. The court de-
clared that in the final analysis, the unionists by the use of their pick-
ets virtually attempted, without the assistance of a court, to enjoin
the Steel Co. from operating its plants.
The laborers proceeded to enforce their injunction not only
against the Steel Co., but also against all non-union molders. Now
it is evident that no possible law could give the union a right to dic-
tate in a fashion which would indicate that it is the exponent of some
higher law than that which may be administered by the courts. If,
accordingly, it was unlawful for the workers to attempt to issue an
injunction in such a manner, the means wherewith to enforce the
injunction were certainly equally unlawful. And therefore, since it
appeared that the picketing was the one admittedly effective means,
it follows that the court cannot possibly permit its use.
Speaking of the matter of persuasion, the opinion states that no
group of men have the right to force their Opinions upon others by
physical demonstrations. It is conclusively shown that the only way
by which the picketing could have been made effective was for it to
have resulted in intimidation. Moreover, persuasion, if it be too
emphatic or too long and persistently continued, was held to consti-
tute a nuisance and an unlawful coercion. The court concludes,
"that no harm can result to the defendants by the granting of the
injunction, except that they will be deprived of what they apparently
conceived to be their right to enforce the unauthorized injunction
which they themselves have issued."
District Judge McPherson, in Atchison, T. & S.' F. Ry. v.
Gee,' after pointing out that all manner of threats, abuse, and vio-
lence had been used by the picketers, that the picketing had been
maintained for a year with little respect for the rights of anyone,
declared in forceful language that there can be no such thing as
peaceful picketing. He concludes that peaceful picketing does not
exist any more than chaste vulgarity, or peaceful mobbing, or lawful
lynching. "When men want to converse or persuade, they do not
organize a picket line. When they only want to see who are at work,
they go and see, and then leave, and disturb no one physically or
1 10 Fed. 698-1901.
' 139 Fed. 582-1905.
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mentally. The argument seems to be that anything short of physical
violence is lawful. One man can be intimidated only when knocked
down. But the peaceful, law-abiding man can be and is intimidated
by gesticulations, by menaces, by being called harsh names, and by
being followed or compelled to pass by men known to be un-
friendly. . . . The frail man must be protected, and the company
has the right to employ such."
In a decision of Judge Sanborn, in Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron
Molders' Union No. 125,s we find again that not much faith is put in the
possibility of any actual -peaceful picketing." The mere fact that
there were a large number of pickets acting together was held to
make acts unlawful which if accomplished by one man would have been
lawful. The persistent following of the workmen to and from their
work, day after day for months, was shown to constitute per se a
constant threat producing fear and alarm among them. Also, if after
repeated acts of violence which were clearly illegal the strikers con-
tinued to resort to picketing and created an unfriendly atmosphere
about the workers, such continued action amounted to an unlawful con-
spiracy and could be properly enjoined. The picketing had passed
from the peaceful purpose of promoting the economic ends of the
union men, and had entered the unlawful stage of malicious injury.
A very recent decision following the precedent of Beck v. Rail-
way Teamsters," makes it appear that any form of picketing is ille-
gal. in re Langell presents the acme of judicial bigotry in connec-
tion with the subject. An injunction had been issued from the cir-
cuit court which forbade the strikers from picketing the premises of
their former employer. Shortly after this, one of the leaders sta-
tioned himself opposite the premises while the employees of the com-
pany were going to work. He said nothing to any one and made no
attempt to interfere with them in any fashion. A dissenting opinion
declared that the tvidence showed that his action was not a part of
any organized scheme to annoy or to watch. He merely went on the
street of his own motion. Despite all these facts, he was found
guilty of contempt of the injunction, and upon appeal to the supreme
court the verdict was upheld by a majority. Chief Justice McAlvay
makes the sweeping statement that all picketing is illegal, and that
such a rule is more reasonable than that which holds certain acts of
picketing lawful. He quotes the following as authority: "The doc-
trine that there may be a moral intimidation which is illegal, an-
'150 Fed. 155-1906.
'Cited supra.178 Mich. 305-1914.
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nounced by the supreme court of Massachusetts,' was among the
first judicial steps taken in this country toward overturning the rule
permitting peaceable picketing, . and was a forerunner of the
later rule that there can be no such thing as peaceable picketing, and
consequently that all picketing is illegal." This quotation, coming as
it does from a Cyclopaedia of Law and Procedure, indicates the
extent to which some cc.urts will go in following precedent, even
though such precedent be not acurately and thoroughly established.
PICKETING AS A LEGAL AcT. After the foregoing review of the
important cases which held picketing unlawful per se, we come to
an analysis of those decisions which concede that under certain
circumstances it may be considered as a lawful act. In general,
no injunction will issue against the picket, if it be strictly and in
good faith confined to the purpose of gaining information concerning
the persons remaining in, or about to seek employment, or of peace-
ably persuading such persons, if not under contract, to leave their
employment, or not to accept employment. Thus, in Cumberland
Glass Mfg. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Association," it was firmly
stated that the mere act of picketing without some other act eviden-
tial of coercion, is not in itself evidence of intimidation. It was
pointed out that the decision of the question must rest upon the circum-
stances surrounding each case-such for example, as the size of the
picket, the extent of their occupation, and what they say and do. If
the strikers are stationed for the purpose of seeing who can be made
the subject of peaceable persuasion, no injunction will issue against
them.
Justice Holmes, now of the U. S. Supreme Court, in a dissenting
opinion handed down in Vegelahn v. Gunter (reviewed above), main-
tains that the picket does not always carry with it a threat of bodily
harm. He feels that the more intelligent workmen realize full well
that they cannot resort to force since they clearly have nothing to
gain by such action. On social grounds, the Justice declares that the
employees have as much right to use any justifiable weapons in their
competition with capital, as have various competing units of capitalis-
tic organizations. He declares that the policy of free competition
applies to all conflicts of temporal interests. He adds, "It is plain
from the slightest consideration of practical affairs, or the most
superficial reading of industrial history, that free competition means
combination, and that the organization of the world, now going on
0 Vegelahn v. Gunter--cited supra.
9 59 New Jersey Equity 49-1899.
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so fast, means an ever increasing might and scope of combination.
It seems to me futile to set our faces against this tendency."
Here we have an excellent example of one view within the
courts, assuming conditions to be progressive, and attempting to
make the law conform to the conditions. The spirit of this decision
is thus in direct contradistinction to that of the majority of the court
(detailed above), which follows closely the letter of the law.
That the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the picket depends upon
the purpose with which it is carried on and the effect which is pro-
duced by it, is the substance of another important opinion, handed down
in Fletcher Co. v. International Machinists."' If the purpose and effect
are shown to be to intimidate, to interfere with the employer's right to
have labor flow freely to him so that a reasonably courageous person
would be prevented from offering his labor, then the picketing is held to
be patently unlawful. The court summarizes the conditions of lawful
picketing in the following concise manner: "If, however, the picket-
ing is carried on for the mere purpose of conveying information to
persons seeking or willing to receive the same, or even, in some cases,
for the purpose of bringing orderly and peaceable persuasions to bear
upon the minds of men who desire to listen to the same, the object
of such persuasions not including in any way the disruption of an
existing contract for labor, then there may be no unlawful element
in the picketing, and carrying it on may found no action even at law,
and certainly not call for any interference on the part of a court of
equity."
Judge Taylor, in Pope Motor Car Co. v. Keegan,21 takes a position
in some respects similar to that of Justice Holmes (Vegelahn v. Gun-
ter). Here it is maintained that the more intelligent artisans realize
that law-abiding tactics will advance them to a larger extent than
unlawful force; and hence, that it is wrong to assume that picketing
by all classes of men at all times is illegal. The court believes that
with the self-restraint which is gradually growing among the work.
ers, picketing may be properly conducted. Agreeing with Judge
Hadley's opinion in Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Wood-
workers* Local Union,' the Pope Company case finds that argument
and persuasion are proper methods of the strikers so long as they
leave the persons solicited feeling at liberty to comply or not, as they
please.
The Supreme Court of Georgia ordered, in Jones v. Van Winkle
10 55 Atlantic 1077-1903.
"1 150 Fed. 148-1906.1275 N. E. 877-1905.
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Gin and Machine Works,3 that the injunction be modified so that the
strikers be not enjoined from using all form of persuasion. Legiti-
mate and moral suasion are permitted to the picketers so long as they
do not thereby resort to coercive or intimidating measures, and do not
obstruct the public thoroughfares.
The Illinois Court of Appeals, in Christensen v. Kellog Switch-
board and Supply Co.,1" while severely condemning the use of picket-
ing accompanied by force and violence, admits that peaceable argu-
ment or persuasion is not unlawful and will not be restrained by a
court of equity.
When it is demonstrated to the court's satisfaction, as in Everett-
Waddey Co. v. Richmond Typographical Union," that the members
of the union have not, by their numbers or by any threats or violence
of gesture or language, kept employees away from a printing estab-
lishment, and have not prevented any person from seeking employ-
ment there-then the court will hold that the employer is not entitled
to the extraordinary relief by injunction.
Justice Andrews, of the New York Supreme Court, in Foster v.
Retail Clerks' International Protective Association," assumes the
broadest and most favorable position concerning several aspects of
picketing, which may be found in the whole line of decided cases. It
was shown that two of the picketers were not at all personally inter-
ested in the lot of the retail clerks, that they were not members of
the union, and were at the utmost merely sympathizers with the
efforts of fellow workmen to improve their condition. The question
then arose-Did these men have any justifiable motive for their ac-
tion, and in the absence of such motive did not the picketing consti-
tute an unlawful conspiracy? The court by way of answering, held
that only in certain well-established legal actions, such, e. g., as mali-
cious prosecution and slander of title, did motive constitute an
element of civil wrong. To attempt to extend this doctrine of motive
beyond these exceptional cases in such a way as to make it cover
injuries inflicted by picketing would have been to violate precedent
and to make new rules of law without any sufficient reason. There-
fore, it was declared that peaceful picketing, irrespective of the
underlying motive, was at all times lawful, provided there be no
threat or intimidation.
A second important principle was affirmed in this case. If it be
12 131 Georgia 336-1908.
14 110 IlL Appeals 61-1903.
"153 S. E. 273-1906.14 39 Misc. Reports 48-1902.
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assumed that picketing by an individual is lawful, it does not become
unlawful because of an agreement between two or more. The
court points out that many decisions have held that combination
makes the act unlawful; but this point of view is shown to be falla-
cious. Two bases for such decisions are thus refuted: "By some it
is said that the reason is that the combined acts of several are likely
to be more harmful than the act of one. 'A man may encounter the
acts of a single person, yet not be fairly matched against several.'
But why should this consideration convert a right into a wrong? It
may effect the remedy. It may justify, for instance, an injunction to
protect against a conspiracy to libel, notwithstanding the rule that a
libel by an individual may not be enjoined. It can hardly do more.
Others have said that the reason is based upon the maxim de mitimis
non curat lex. The injury done by one is so small that the law will
not regard it. But is that so? Is the injury done by one necessarily,
and this is the test, so trivial that it need not be recognized by the
courts? Might not a man of great influence conceivably work much
more harm than a combination of others less well known? Tht
whole theory is, I think, erroneous. A conspiracy is an agreement
to do an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by unlawful means.
There can be no conspiracy if the act aimed at is lawful and if the
means employed also are lawful." Accordingly, it was found that the
picketers committed no wrong when they combined with others
peaceably to induce persons by persuasion to refrain from trading with
the Foster Company.
Three very recent decisions in the United States Circuit Courts
of Appeals evidence a decided unanimity of opinion in holding that
picketing is legal when peaceable. It is probable, acocrdingly, that in
the future, federal courts will follow the rule established in these
cases. However, it must be noted that the statement of the legality
of the picket in itself is regularly connected with a condemnation of
violence and intimidation as they actually occur in the cases at issue.
In Kolley v. Robinson,"t Judge Reiner found the very plan of
picketing to constitute a substantial exhibition of force. Abuse,
threats, obstruction, physical assaults-all were cited as sufficient
cause for the issue of an injunction which would never have been
granted had the picketers resorted merely to peaceful means in per-
suading others to leave their employment.
That the size of the picket contributes largely to its status as in-
timidation, was held in Sona v. Aluminum Castings Co." Moreover,
1 187 Fed. 415-1911.
is 214 Fed. 936-1914.
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here the court refused to review the evidence, since it held the lower
tribunal competent to decide whether the acts complained of consti-
tuted intimidation and obstruction of the employees. Again, the pos-
sibility of legal persuasion was recognized along with the unlawful-
ness of the intimidation as established.
In the final case, that of Bittner v. West Virginia-Pittsburgh
Coal Co.," the court expressly declared that an injunction restraining
the employees from peaceful picketing should not have been granted.
As a result, the injunction was modified and the lower court issuing
it overruled.
RICT OF E~I PL.OY R TO I XvOKE Powilt OF EQUITY. The above cited
cases relate to injunctions which have been issued or refused upon
the application of the employer whose premises were picketed. Few
of these cases consider the ground upon which the right of the em-
ployer to invoke the power of equity rests. In Jersey City Printing
Co. v. Cassidy, -0 however, the situation is discussed by Vice Chan-
cellor Green from a point of view which the trade-unionist would
probably denounce as dangerously capitalistic in sentiment. Here, it
is bluntly stated, that the purpose of the injunction is to provide the
employer the right to enjoy a free and natural flow of the labor
market. The decision apparently holds to a laissez-faire doctrine
when it maintains that every man has the right of absolute freedom
to employ or to be employed. Then it is pointed out that the basis
of what is called the employer's "probable expectancy" of a free
labor market is a peculiar, possibly friendly interest which he has in
the freedom of another. The court in attempting to fortify its posi-
tion as a defender of the employer's right of "probable expectancy,"
holds up before us the following social justification: "A large part
of what is most valuable in modern life seems to depend more or
less directly upon 'probable expectancies.' When they fail, civiliza-
tion, as at present organized, may go down. As social and industrial
life develops and grows more complex these *probable expectancies'
are bound to increase. It would seem to be inevitable that courts of
law, as our system of jurisprudence is evolved to meet the growing
wants of an increasingly complex social order, will discover, define
and protect from undue interference more of those 'probable expec-
tancies.'"
Although the opinion is careful to insist that the same freedom
must exist for employee as for employer, it also makes clear that
neither the common law nor equity has as yet sufficiently advanced
214 Fed. 716-1914.
2 63 N.J. Eq. 759-1902.
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as to actually give that freedom to the employee. As a matter of
fact, when employees, whether legally or not, are blacklisted, they
are most decidedly deprived of their freedom and of their "probable
expectancy." No impartial student can read the decision without
becoming possessed by the feeling that a burning injustice is here
inflicted upon the employees. Without attempting to refute the.
statements quoted above, it is sufficient to point out that the court
instead of assuming a progressive and enlightened attitude in the
matter of the labor market, takes the undignified position of attempt-
ing to make law upon a reactionary basis. When the decision speaks
of "growing wants of an increasingly complex social order," it turns
its countenance to the employer while it is blind to the needs and
expectancies of the employee. It is evident that Vice Chancellor
Green proceeds upon the theory that the best method to advance is
to ignore one-half of the situation.
PART IV.
INJUNCTION AND PROCEEDINGS IN CONTEMPT.
CONTEMPT DeFmNkl)- Contempt of court has been defined as a
"despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the court; and he
is guilty of contempt whose conduct is such as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard.""1
Courts have declared that their usefulness and efficiency ,.ould not
possibly exist without this power to enforce obedience to their oriers
and to remove any unlawful or unwarranted interference with their
dispensation of justice. In general, contempt- -.-e classified as direct
or constructive. Direct contempts are said to be those committed in
the presence of the court. Contempts are constructive when they
are committed beyond the court, and are such acts as tend to obstruct,
embarrass, or prevent the proper administration of justice. Again,
constructive contempts may be either criminal--4hat is, conduct
directed against the dignity or authority of the court itself; or civil--
that is, conduct directed against some civil right of a party to judi-
cial proceedings.22
In labor disputes, contempt proceedings have been invoked against
violators of injunctions, at times, by the judges who issue the
restraining order, and again, at the request of the employer who
claims to be injured by the violation of the order. Thus, for the
ft Dahnke v. People, 168 I1. 102-1897.
22 Note: 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1098.
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purpose of this discussion, we shall confine our consideration to the
criminal and civil aspects of contempt proceedings arising in the
manner indicated.
CONTEUPT AS CIVIL Ol CmINAL,, PkOCmING. To place con-
tempt proceedings in the proper category as civil or criminal has
caused our courts much effort. Extreme confusion exists when an
attempt is made to draw from the decisions any conclusions as to
general principles concerning the matter. The question is a vital one,
for many of the most important cases hinge upon it as the controlling
point. No single opinion can be pointed to as being finally authori-
tative, but it will suffice to state the views of the United States Su-
preme Court in obtaining a reasonably comprehensive view.
In the long extended series of cases arising from the dispute
between the Federation of Labor and the Buck's Stove and Range
Co., many issues affecting the fortunes of the trade unionist and its
powerful weapon, the boycott, came up for decision. Among these
issues, contempt, in the later stages of the conflict, took the place of
pre-eminence. In order to gain a proper understanding of the situa-
tion, however, a somewhat detailed resumi of the various proceedings
is necessary.
When it became clear that Mr. Van Cleave, president of the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers, as well as president of the
Buck's Co., was firm in his intention not to yield a single point to the
unionists, the American Federation took up the tongs for the local
polishers, and Mr. Gompers placed the name of the firm on the "We
Don't Patronize List." The Federation, by means of its centralized
machinery, put into operation an effective, nation-wide boycott
against Mr. Van Cleave's product.
Upon request of the injured concern, a most sweeping injunc-
tion was granted restraining the Federation, its officers, and the local
union from "interfering in any manner with the sale of the products
of the plaintiff, and from declaring or threatening any boycott
against the complainant, or in any manner assisting such boycotts, or
printing or distributing through the mails any paper which contained
any reference to the name of the complainant, its business or product
in connection with the term 'Unfair' or 'We Don't Patronize' list,
or from publishing or otherwise circulating any statement or notice,
calling attention to complainant's customers, or of dealers or trades-
men, or the public, to any boycott against the complainants, or from
coercing or inducing any dealer not to trade with complainant."
Gompers and two other officials of the Federation, in Decem.
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ber, 1908, were pronounced guilty of contempt of court and were
given prison sentences. About three months later, Justice Robb, of
the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia," upon appeal,
modified the original injunction, so that most of the acts of Gompers
and his associates became legal. In spite of this decision, upon ap-
peal from the 1908 contempt proceedings, the defendants were ag.in
declared guilty.2' Both injunction and contempt cases were merged
into one, and the matter was finally brought to the Supreme Court
of the United States. During the year 1910, however, the death of
Mr. Van Cleave, and the ensuing change of management, together
with the great evident loss from the boycott, caused the Buck's peo-
ple to compromise the struggle and make peace with the union. The
Federation, thereupon widely advertised the settlement, and friends
of labor were requested to patronize the company. In view of this
situation, the injunction proceedings were dismissed.23
The case of Gompers v. Buck's Stove and Range Co." was a
review by the Supreme Court of the judgment of 1909, committing
Gompers, Morrison and Mitchell for contempt. The opinion, after
declaring that the boycott was an unlawful conspiracy, passes on to
a discussion of whether the contempt was criminal or civil and to the
effect of such distinction upon the case at issue.
First of all, it was pointed o'ut that contempts are neither wholly
civil nor altogether criminal. However, Mr. Justice Lamar declared
that the character and purpose of the punishment often serve to make
clear the distinction. If the purpose be remedial, that is, for the
benefit of the complainant, the contempt is said to be civil; if it be
punitive, that is, to vindicate the authority of the court, the contempt
is classified as criminal. When it is maintained that imprisonment
is often ordered for civil contempt, it follows that punishment may
be remedial as well as punitive. Thus many civil contempt-pro-
ceedings have resulted not only in the imposition of a fine, payable
to the complainant, but also in committing the defendant to prison.
But in these cases the imprisonment was inflicted not as a punish-
ment, but as a remedial measure intending to coerce the defendant
to perform the affirmative act required by the court's order. If im-
prisoned, he is said to carry the keys of his prison in his own
pocket.'
2 A. F. of L. v. Buck's Co. 33 App. D. C. 83-1909.
" Gomers v. Buck's Co. 33 App. D. C. 516-1909.
"s Bucks Stove and Range Co. v. A. F. of L. 219 U. S. 581-1911.
" 221 U.S. 418-1911.2T In Re Nevitt. 117 Fed. 45-1902.
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"On the other hand, if the defendant does that which he has
been commanded not to do, the disobedience is a thing accomplished.
Imprisonment cannot undo or remedy what has been done nor afford
any compensation for the pecuniary injury caused by the disobe-
dience." Such imprisonment operates solely as punishment for the
completed act of disobedience.
The court then summarizes as follows: "The distinction be-
tween refusing to do an act commanded-remedial by imprisonment
until the party performs the required act (civil contempt) ; and doing
an act forbidden-punished by imprisonment for a definite term
(criminal contempt) ; affords a test by which to determine the char-
acter of the punishment."
In this case, Gompers' contempt did not consist in refusing to do
an affirmative act required, but rather in doing that which had been
prohibited by the injunction. Accordingly, here was a plain neces-
sity for an action for criminal contempt. Justice Lamar conclusively
shows that the entire action in the lower court was on the contrary
a proceeding for civil contempt. The Buck's Stove and Range Co.
were the complainants; whereas, in a proceeding for criminal con-
tempt, the government should have been the prosecutor, so that the
case would have been entitled U. S. v. Gompers. Further indication
of the nature of the proceedings as civil rather than criminal is dis-
covered in the fact that the Buck's Co. attorneys placed Gompers and
his associates upon the stand and made them witnesses for the com-
pany. If the suit had been considered criminal in nature, this would
most likely not have been considered, since the constitution guaran-
tees that "no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."
The Buck's people, finally, asked in substance for the imposi-
tion of a fine payable to them as additional punishment for the con.
tempt. Here was another evidence of the civil nature of the proceed-
ings. Reviewing the whole situation, it was evident that the court
below imposed the penalty of imprisonment for a definite term upon
Gompers for criminal contempt, since as pointed out above, he was
guilty of violating the court's order. This action was taken in an-
swer to a prayer for remedial relief in the equity cause which
amounted to a proceeding for civil contempt. Thus there was an im-
proper variation between the procedure adopted (civil) and the pun-
ishment imposed (criminal), and the court declared the result was
fundamentally erroneous. In other words, Gompers was tried for
civil contempt and punished as for criminal contempt.
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Since the main cause was settled" by the agreement of the par-
ties, this civil contempt proceeding which was necessarily a part of
it, was thereby also settled, and Gompers was adjudged not guilty. I
have followed this somewhat intricate reasoning in order to bring
clearly to the reader's mind one statement of the distinction between
criminal and civil contempt. As an illustration of the extreme con-
trariety on the part of the courts, and of the inherent difficulty of
collating the decisions, it is only necessary to point to the case of
Rothschild v. Steger and Sons Piano Company." Here, one year
later the Supreme Court of Illinois declared that the Supreme Court
decision was not binding upon it; and held in substance that there
was no difference between civil and criminal contempt. It practically
stated that in its opinion the United States Supreme Court was wrong,
when it maintained that in a civil contempt imprisonment for a defi-
nite term may be imposed. But on the whole, the majority of coutt
decisions tend toward some kind of recognition of the principle
affirmed in the Buck's case reviewed above.
This decision, however, did not end the controversy between
Gompers and the Anti-Boycott organization. Justice Lamar had,
while dismissing the contempt proceedings wrongly brought, avow-
edly left open the possibility of the District of Columbia court pun-
ishing for contempt by proper method. Justice Wright. 4pon a rec-
ommendation of a biased committee consisting of the attorneys who
had prosecuted the case for the National Manufacturers' Associa-
tion, in 1912, again pronounced the defendants guilty.'" Upon appeal,
the sentence was reduced and confirmed as thus modified.31
The case of Gompers v. United States,83 in the Supreme Court,
finally settled the whole matter. Justice Holmes decided that inas-
much as contempt proceedings were not properly instituted until
more than three years after the commission of the acts charged,
and that since the contempt in question amounted to a crime, Gom-
pers could not be punished because the law virtually sets a three-
year limit on the power of a court to punish thus for any crime.
NoTicE OR ACTUAL KwowLwa- or INiJUNCION. In general, it
may be said that before any individual may be attached for contempt
of court, he must have notice of the injunction or some actual
knowledge of it. Thus, as was held in both Consolidated Steel and
8 See Above.
"9 256 IlL 196-1912.
8 In Re Gompers, 40 Wash. Law Rep., 417-1912.
:1 In Re Gompers, 40 Wash. Law Rep.. 290-1913.
"233 U. S. 604-1914.
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Wire Co. v. Murray," and in United States v. Coal Dealers' Associa-
tion,"' an injunction may properly go against a trade union by name
and will operate to restrain all of its members who have knowledge
of it.
Instances have arisen where a person not a party to the injunc-
tion has violated it. Here, the rule may be briefly stated; if the per-
son can be shown to have had actual notice of the injunction, he may
be adjudged guilty of contempt for its violation. More general
knowledge will not serve to convict.
EFFECT OF APPEAL FROM ENJOINING ORDnER. At times, dur-
ing an appeal from an injunction, the unionists violate the order and
as a result are committed for contempt. In Barnes v. Typographical
Union." the issue was raised as to the validity of the lower court's
contempt proceedings during an appeal of the original enjoining
order. The opinion held that the trial court had the clear right to
punish for contempt any act which violated the injunction during
the appeal. To the contention that the lower court might not punish
for contempt until after the case had been passed upon by the higher
tribunal, the decision said, "The adoption of a rule that the court,
granting an injunction must stand idly by and see it violated while
an appeal is pending and after the case is reinstated in that court,
may then proceed to punish, would be attended with evil conse-
quences. All that it would be necessary for a defendant to do to
secure immunity until the case should be re-instated in the court
would be to pray an appeal and file a bond. . . . If the court
should be denied the right to compel obedience to the prohibition of
the decree until the original case has completed its rounds through
the courts, the appellees might lose all the benefits of their litigation
and have their business ruined, although the decree should finally be
affirmed."
If the injunction had been mandatory in character, requiring
something to be done, and the violator of the order had refused to
obey it during appeal, then he might not be summoned for contempt
since such a summons would constitute an execution to enforce the
command. In this case, however, the injunction in its nature as a
prohibitory decree may be termed self-executing. An appeal from
such an order could not stay the power of the court to compel obedi-
ence. Thus, the right to maintain the court's authority, was held in
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It seems to me that a more reasonable rule would be to prevent
the lower court from attaching for contempt pending the appeal and
to permit the defendant to disobey the injunction at his own risk. If
the judgment be reversed the defendant should not suffer since his
acts were in no way illegal.
RIGHT OF TRIAL BY Juay. One of the oldest and at the same
time most famous cases which voices an authoritative opinion as to
the violation of the constitutional right of trial by jury, by a sum-
mary punishment for contempt, may be found in the United States
Supreme Court records. entitled, In Re Debs.30 When the petitioner,
Debs, applied for a writ of habeas corpus, one of the contentions was
based on the fact that his constitutional right of trial by jury had
been invaded by his imprisonment at the hands of the judge of the
circuit court. By way of reply, Justice Brewer, quoting many rul-
ings to uphold his decision, declared that a court must have the right
to inquire itself whether there has been any disobedience of its orders
so that it may properly enforce them. "To submit, he added, "the
question of disobedience to another tribunal, be it jury or another
court, would operate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency."
The ruling agreed with the quoted cases that when a court enforces
its orders by proceedings for contempt, it is not executing the crimi-
nal laws of the land, but is only securing to suitors the right to which
it has adjudged them entitled. Moreover, when. some interference
with property rights appears, the jurisdiction of a court of equity
arises, and is not destroyed by the fact that they are accompanied by,
or are themselves violation of the criminal law. Thus, if the acts
in the Debs case were violations of criminal law such matte-r would
be still open to criminal prosecution even after the defendants had
been punished for the same acts as constituting violation of the equity
injunction.
District Judge Rogers, in United States v. Sweeney, a labor
case," refers the claim, that persons who violate injunctions are en-
titled under the constitution to a trial by jury, to the decision in the
Debs case as follows: "That case was argued by as great lawyers
as are in this country, and was decided by the greatest court in the
world. Until it is overturned it must be held to be the law of the
land."
The fact that criminal prosecutions with trial by jury are wholly
ineffective for the protection of the "scab" employee and his em-
as 158 U. S. 599-1894.
2195 Fed. 434-1899.
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ployer constitutes the justification which the opinion in Southern
Railway Co. v. Machinists' Local Union No. 14," finds for the use of
the equitable remedy. In passing, it might be well to note that Judge
Hammond, in delivering himself of a rabidly anti-union decision, uses
as his controlling authority an equally rabid article in the North
American Review (volume 173, p. 445), by the Most Reverend
Archbishop Ireland. Having the church to fight is apparently not the
least of the laboring-man's worries. Judge McPherson, in Union
Pacific Railway Co. v. Reuf," declared that when the constitution ot
the United States provides that "in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the rights to a speedy and public trial by an im-
partial jury," it does not say that in all cases the right of trial by
jury shall exist, merely in all criminal cases. It is assumed that since
equity proceedings existed at the time of the adoption of the consti-
tution, the right of trial by jury in equity would have been granted
if the fathers had so willed.
In 1893, the legislature of Illinois passed an act providing for a
trial by jury in all cases where a judgment was to be satisfied by im-
prisonment. O'Brien v. The People,4' held that this act did not apply
to contempt proceedings brought against the strikers for the violation
of an enjoining order. Likewise, the territorial legislature of Okla-
homa, in 1895, enacted a statute which provided that any person
charged with an indirect (constructive) contempt, might have, upon
demand, a change of judge or venue, and a trial by jury. The case
of Smith v. Speed,' held such enactment unconstitutional, since it
made equitable jurisdiction inadequate to protect the citizen in his
rights, including that of trial by jury. Thus, the court could not see
with equanimity the writ of injunction bereft of its power by an act
which made contempt proceedings dependent upon the whim of a
jury or some other judge.
It will be of interest to note in this connection, Ex-President
Taft's view of the matter as expressed in his "Present Day Prob-
lems.' 2 Because of the popular doubt as to the judges* impartial atti-
tude in contempt proceedings, Mr. Taft believes he would give the
-defendant the right to ask for another judge to hear the issue. "I do
not think," he states, "that it would seriously delay the hearing of
the cause, and it would give more confidence in the impartiality of
"s 111 Fed. 49-1901.
"120 Fed. 112-1902.40216 I1. 354-1905.
" 11 MI. 95-1901.112 Page 272.
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the decision. It is almost as important that there should be the
appearance of justice as that there should be an actual administration
of it." But when it comes to the question of the trial of contempt by
jury, the learned professor declares that "to introduce another con-
test before the writ shall be enforced with all the uncertainties and
digressions and prejudices that are injected into a jury trial, would
be to make the order of the court go for nothing."
I have reserved for the last the only judicial utterance which
upholds the right of trial by jury in contempt proceedings. Judge
Caldwell, in a dissenting opinion in Hopkins v. Oxley Stove Co.,
vigorously justifies the right, and ruthlessly condemns those who
attempt to rule by injunction. This "voice from the wilderness,"
protesting against all recorded authority, deserves in my opinion a
warm place in the affections of those who sympathize with the
worker. The opinion forcefully objects to equity jurisdiction and the
injunction when used as a "short-cut" in dealing with those-who vio-
late the law. It concedes that the enjoining order avoids the delay
and uncertainty incident to a jury trial, occasions less expense, and
insures a speedier punishment. "But," it continues, in telling fash-
ion, "the logical difficulty with this reasoning is that it confers juris-
diction on the mob equally with the chancellor. Those who justify
or excuse mob law do it upon the ground that the administration of
criminal justice in the courts is slow and expensive, and the results
sometimes unsatisfactory. It can make little dfference to the victims
of short-cut and unconstitutional methods whether it is the mob or
the chancellor that deprives them of their constitutional rights. It is
vain to disguise the fact that this desire for a short-cut originates in
the feeling of hostility to trial by jury-a mode of trial which has
never been popular with the aristocracy of wealth, or the corpora-
tions and trusts. A distrust of the jury is a distrust of the people,
and a distrust of the people means the overthrow of the government
our fathers founded."
After asserting that the provisions in the constitution on the sub-
ject of trial by jury are plain and unambiguous, he adds: "These
mandatory provisions of the constitutions are not obsolete, and are
not to be nullified by mustering against them a little horde of equity
maxims and obsolete precedents originating in a monarchial govern-
ment having no written constitution. . . . These constitutional
guarantees are not to be swept aside by an equitable invention which
would turn crime into a contempt, and enable a judge to declare in-
nocent acts crimes, and punish them at his discretion. But notwith-
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standing the constitution expressly enumerates the only exceptions
to the right of trial by jury, and positively limits those exceptions
to the cases mentioned, those who favor government by injunction
propose to ingraft upon that instrument numerous other exceptions
which would deprive the great body of citizens of the republic of
their constitutional right of trial by jury. With the interpolations
essential to support government by injunction, the constitution would
contain the following further exceptions to the right of trial by jury:
'And except when many persons are associated together for a com-
mon purpose, and except in the case of members of trades unions,
and other labor organizations, and except in cases of all persons of
small means.'"
To abolish thus the right of trial by jury, Judge Caldwell holds
to be the right of the people. Encroachments by the judiciary foi
such a purpose are never to be tolerated. Instances of English cae
where juries were necessary to protect individuals from .the oppres
sion of the judiciary, and the conclusion that we in this country
learned the lesson from history, leads the court to remark in sum-
ming up: "Our fathers invested the prerogative of maintaining and
defending the people's rights and liberties in the people themselves--
In a jury."
Mr. Henry R. Seager, the noted economist, in an editorial," ex-
presses himself as follows on the subject: "To grant to persons
charged with contempt of court outside the courtroom the right to
trial by jury would be merely to extend to such offenders the same
protection from judicial oppression that our ancestors secured, long
years ago, from executive oppression. Judges who oppose this
change have an appreciation of their importance which seems out ot
harmony with the democratic age in which they are condemned to
live. "I'll be judge, I'll be jury," the proposal of "cunning old fury,"
in the familiar rhyme, is an arrangement more calculated to expedite
convictions than to secure even-handed justice."
In all probability, however, many years are likely to pass before
the judiciary will be willing to submit their decisions in contempt
proceedings to a jury for trial. Little faith can be placed in legis-
lative action on the subject, since as shown above, the courts declare
unconstitutional any provisions which lessen their power to punish
summarily for contempt.
"Survey. 31: 594-1914.
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CONCLUSION.
Generalization presents at all times a difficult problem if one wishes
to proceed with genuine honesty. Any statement of conclusions drawn
from judicial decisions must go hand in hand with a realization that
there may be more cases which oppose than uphold the rule affirmed.
The weight of the opinion, however, may be generally measured by
the importance of the court delivering it. A perusal of the cases cited
above will show, I think, that: (1) at present the strike per se is legal.
(2) A clearly discernible tendency is arising to make peaceful boycot
ting come within the protection of the law. Opposed to these ad-
vances, it is clear that (3) actual picketing is rarely allowed and (4)
that the courts, on the whole, are not likely to give up, of their own
volition the right to punish for contempt. Finally. it is probable that
(5) the courts will continue to issue the writ of injunction in labor
disputes, and as an inevitable concomitant, abuse their power when
no restrictions are placed upon it.
IRL B. ROSENBLUM.
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